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Definition 
In biological systems, closure refers to a holistic feature such that their constitutive processes, 
operations and transformations (1) depend on each other for their production and maintenance 
and (2) collectively contribute to determine the conditions at which the whole organization 
can exist. 
According to several theoretical biologists, the concept of closure captures one of the central 
features of biological organization since it constitutes, as well as evolution by natural 
selection, an emergent and distinctively biological causal regime. In spite of an increasing 
agreement on its relevance to understand biological systems, no agreement on a unique 
definition has been reached so far. 
 
Characteristics 
The concept of closure plays a relevant role in biological explanation since it is taken as a 
naturalized grounding for many distinctive biological dimensions, as purposefulness, 
normativity and functionality (Chandler & Van De Vijver, 2000).  
The contemporary application of closure to the biological domain comes from a philosophical 
and theoretical tradition tracing back at least to Kant who claimed, in the Critique of 
Judgment, that biological systems should be understood as natural purposes (Naturzwecke), 
i.e. systems in which the parts are reciprocally causes and effects of the others, such that the 
whole can be conceived as organized by itself, self-organized. The essence of living system is 
a form of internal and circular causality between the whole and the parts, distinct from both 
efficient causality of the physical world and the final causality of artifacts (Kant, 1985). 
One of the most influential contemporary characterizations of closure in the biological 
domain has been provided by Francisco Varela (1979). In his account, he builds on an 
algebraic notion, according to which “a domain K has closure if all operations defined in it 
remain within the same domain. The operation of a system has therefore closure, if the results 
of its action remain within the system (Bourgine and Varela, 1992: xii)”.  
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Applied to biological systems, closure is realized as what Varela labels operational (or 
organizational) closure, which designates an organization of processes such that “(1) the 
processes are related as a network, so that they recursively depend on each other in the 
generation and realization of the processes themselves, and (2) they constitute the system as a 
unity recognizable in the space (domain) in which the processes exist"  (Varela, 1979: 55).  
It should be noted that Varela himself has proposed, over time, slightly different definitions of 
operational closure. In addition, more recent contributions have introduced a theoretical 
distinction between organizational and operational closure. Whereas “organizational” closure 
indicates the abstract network of relations that define the system as a unity, “operational” 
closure refers to the recurrent dynamics and processes of such a system (Thompson, 2007).  
In Varela‟s view, operational closure is closely related to autonomy, the central feature of 
living organization. More precisely, he enunciates the “Closure Thesis”, according to which 
“every autonomous system is operationally closed (Varela 1979: 58). In principle, the class of 
autonomous systems realizing operational closure is larger than the class of biological 
systems. As a consequence, operational closure is taken as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to define biological organization. Biological systems, in fact, constitute a sub-class 
of autonomous systems, which realize a specific form of operational closure, which Varela 
labels, with Humberto Maturana, autopoiesis (Varela, 1979). The specificity of operational 
closure as autopoiesis is that, unlike other possible forms, it describes the system at the 
chemical and molecular level, and supposes relations of material production among its 
constituents.  
A crucial distinction is usually made between organizational/operational and material closure, 
where the latter indicates the absence or incapacity to interact. While being organizationally 
closed, biological systems are structurally coupled with the environment, with which they 
exchange matter, energy and information. The concept of biological closure implies then a 
distinction between two causal levels, an open and a closed one – an issue which have been 
more explicitly addressed by the account proposed by Robert Rosen (Rosen, 1991).  
Rosen‟s account is based on a rehabilitation and reinterpretation of the Aristotelian categories 
of causality and, in particular, on the distinction between efficient and material cause. Let 
consider an abstract mapping f between the sets A and B, such that f: A=>>B. Represented in a 
relational diagram, we have: 
 
When applied to model natural systems, Rosen claims that the hollow-headed arrow 
represents material causation, a flow from A to B, whereas the solid-headed arrow represents 
efficient causation, a constraint exerted by f on this flow.  
Rosen‟s central thesis is that “a material system is an organism a living system if, and only 
if, it is closed to efficient causation” (Rosen, 1991: 244), whereas a natural system is closed to 
efficient causation if and only if its relational diagram has a closed path that contains all the 
solid-headed arrows. It is worth noting that, unlike the varelian tradition, Rosen takes closure 
as the definition of biological organization.  
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According to Rosen, the central feature of a biological system consists in the fact that all 
components having the status of efficient causes are materially produced by and within the 
system itself. At the most general level, closure is realized in biological systems among three 
classes of efficient causes corresponding to three broad classes of biological functions, that 
Rosen denotes as metabolism (f: A=>>B), repair (: B=>>f) and replication (B: f=>>).   
 
By providing a clear-cut theoretical and formal distinction between material and efficient 
causation, Rosen‟s characterization explicitly spells out that biological organization consists 
of two coexisting causal regimes: closure to efficient causation, which grounds its unity and 
distinctiveness, and openness to material causation, which allows material, energetic and 
informational interactions with the environment.  
More recently, the scientific work on biological closure has been developed in various 
directions (Chandler & Van De Vijver, 2000). In particular, a thriving research line has 
specifically focused on the critical nature of systems realizing closure, which must maintain a 
continuous flow of energy and matter with the environment in conditions far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. To capture this dimension of closure, Stuart Kauffman has 
proposed the notion of Work-Constraint cycle (Kauffman, 2000).  
The Work-Constraint cycle represents an interpretation of organizational closure that links the 
idea of „work‟ to that of „constraint‟, the former being defined, as “constrained release of 
energy into relatively few degrees of freedom”. A system realizes a Work-Constraint cycle if 
it is able to use its work to re-generate at least some of the constraints that make work 
possible. The cycle is a thermodynamic irreversible process, which dissipates energy and 
requires a coupling between exergonic (spontaneous, which release energy) and endergonic 
(non spontaneous, which require energy) reactions, such that exergonic processes are 
constrained in a specific way to produce a work, which can be used to generate endergonic 
processes, which in turn generate those constraints canalizing exergonic processes. In 
Kauffman‟s terms: “Work begets constraints beget work” (Kauffman, 2000). 
A complementary account of closure has been proposed by Howard Pattee, who focused on 
its informational dimension (Pattee, 1982). In his view, biological organization consists of the 
integration of two intertwined dimensions, which cannot be understood separately. On the one 
side, the organization realizes a dynamic and autopoietic network of mechanisms and 
processes, which defines itself as a topological unit, structurally coupled with the 
environment. On the other side, it is shaped by the material unfolding of a set of symbolic 
instructions, stored and transmitted as genetic information.  
According to Pattee, the dynamic/mechanistic and informational dimensions realize a distinct 
form of closure between them, which he labels semantic closure. By this notion, he refers to 
the fact that while symbolic information, to be such, must be interpreted by the dynamics and 
mechanisms that it constrains, the mechanisms in charge of the interpretation and the 
“material translation” require that very information for their own production. Semantic 
closure, as an interweaving between dynamics and information, constitutes then an additional 
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dimension of organizational closure of biological systems, complementary to the 
operational/efficient one.  
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